The world of intelligence is a dark, shadowy realm that often eludes even astute outside observers. However, open source channels provide a window into this universe, which allows for the cost-benefit analysis of having a national intelligence community.

The utilization of intelligence communities can certainly provide tremendous benefits to a regime, but it comes with significant drawbacks in the form of risks for both national and international affairs. Mitigating these risks is possible, but only to a limited extent.

Intelligence Benefits

Fundamentally, intelligence helps protect a nation and keep its leaders informed. Intelligence is the first line of a nation’s defense and provides the eyes and ears of a nation in order to allow it to pursue its goals, both overt and covert, either domestically, internationally or both, while making the best informed decisions. The role of U.S. intelligence is four-fold: 1) homeland defense; 2) perform clandestine activities; 3) support military operations; 4) support national policy. Many other democracies’ have similar intelligence objectives; in non-democratic nations, it is more likely that the role of intelligence meshes with the military or crosses over into politics.

Throughout history, intelligence has provided essential information for military operations. Sun Tzu ended his treatise by saying “Intelligence is of the essence in warfare – it is what the armies depend upon in their every move.” Intelligence takes on added importance in a political war, as discussed by Jon Wiant regarding the Vietnam War, and the War on Terror, as described by Phil Mudd. Also, as Keegan discussed in chapter six, intelligence can be the turning point in war, seen in the Battle of Midway. Notably, intelligence cannot win wars, but it can set up a victory. Perhaps the most famous example of a tide-turning war-time intelligence operation was the British WWII gambit creating a false identity for an officer to feign an attack in Greece instead of Italy. Here, intelligence saved thousands of lives during war. On the flip side, intelligence can also keep the peace by preventing an attack, such as the August 2006 transatlantic airlines plot.

Another advantage is that intelligence is uniquely suited to combat terrorism. Conventional military forces, diplomats and law enforcement officials are limited in their ability to counter terrorism. Intelligence officers are the only officials directly responsible for tracking terrorists. The comparison between the role of intelligence in the Cold War versus the War on Terror was aptly described in the lecture by Phil Mudd, who highlighted intelligence’s elevated role today due to the nature of the conflicts. Intelligence is of premier importance in the War on Terror’s most often used tools which involve national security (i.e., covert operations), as opposed to national power (i.e., economic sanctions).

Protection from WMD is also one of intelligence’s primary objectives. As Keegan described in chapter eight, secret weapons can have a watershed effect on war; however, WMD remains a threat regardless of whether a nation is at war. A nation’s internal analytical component of assessing WMD also faces myriad fallacies, which Jervis cautioned against. Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, the failed Chechnyan attack in Moscow in 1997 and the 9/11 attacks are all examples of the threat WMD pose. In fact, at a recent conference in Edinburgh, a senior Scottish official warned that a terrorist dirty bomb or nuclear was “inevitable” and would happen “sometime soon.”1

Perhaps the greatest benefit is that successful intelligence work has the effect of changing events inside a country to another nation’s liking while keeping its hand hidden. Some countries have a strong stigma against others, so intelligence works to see that its ideas are made to seem like they are home grown, thus quietly building grassroots support abroad. One good example is Radio-Free Europe. This is a form of psychological warfare and propaganda, two key functions of intelligence, which are low risk and can potentially provide remarkable long term benefits.

Intelligence Drawbacks

Intelligence comes at a very serious cost. Covert operations often run high risk with low odds of success. Worse, operations can be exposed, causing perennial embarrassment domestically and abroad – as seen by the Bay of Pigs invasion and the failed Desert One rescue mission. An even greater risk is run by successful operations that turn out far worse in the long run. The classic example of this phenomenon is the U.S. decades-long support for the shah of Iran, which helped trigger the Iranian Revolution and U.S. embassy seizure.

Another disadvantage of intelligence is that “good” services can be used for illicit purposes. This was the case with U.S. intelligence activities exposed by the Church-Pike Committees. Of course, this type of abrogation can be corrected, but it caused a national backlash against intelligence and stigmatized its national perception. Another potential abuse is targeted assassination, examples of which include the alleged FSB murder of Alexander Litvinenko and the “Who Killed Ashraf Marwan?” article.

Other intelligence systems have an entirely different set of drawbacks. One school of thought was posited by Kautilya, who advocated using spies pervasively – domestic and foreign – for the sake of protecting the regime. The East German Stasi exemplified this well, whose vast network contained voluminous files on every citizen.

Intelligence generally is also subject to deception, disinformation, politicization, and at best, is incomplete. Even accurate assessments can be misused, especially because intelligence estimates do not offer a set of policy recommendations, leaving policymakers the option to ignore or utilize it in any way they see fit, even if they present a partial or bias account. Additionally, rigorous security must be maintained to protect intelligence products and information. Not only does deception occur when an officer collects information, but deception can also occur from within – and the threat from Counter-Intelligence can be as long-term psychologically damaging as it is in the near-term physically damaging. Such was the case with U.S. intelligence after the Ames and Hanssen outings.

In the Global War on Terror, intelligence is handicapped when compared to the Cold War. During the Cold War, it was easier to recruit Soviet officials who had little if any choice in their profession and whom may have desired to relocate to the West. In fact, many communists defected voluntarily; of course, recipients of defectors were subject to deception. In the War on Terror, however, it is nearly impossible to recruit a member of a terrorist cell living in an isolated, lawless mountainous region who is a fervent absolutist and voluntarily chose to commit himself to the cause of declaring war on America. Thus human intelligence is severely hindered in this conflict.

Running Blind

In order to fully analyze whether a community could be done without, the world without it must be considered. The consequences of not having an intelligence community would blind a country – it would have no eyes and ears on the ground. The country would be robbed of forewarning about rising anti-American sentiment, no knowledge of the underground locals who cooperate in resistance movements, no secret information on weapons of mass destruction – all of which can lead to disaster.

Furthermore, the nation would be forced to rely on other nations for intelligence because so much of what leaders need to know in order to make informed decisions involves that which is unknown. Granted, there are allied intelligence services, but there are no friendly intelligence services. Other nations will tell a country what they want it to know in order to encourage behavior that is in their interest.

How would the U.S. war in Afghanistan have been fought without intelligence? In October 2001, 440 CIA officers and special forces, with air support, overthrew the Taliban and al-Qaeda along with the Northern Alliance. The rest of the U.S. military did not join the fight until November due in part to logistics. Moreover, real-time intelligence has been crucial in pursuing the manhunt for al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

Finally, it should also be noted that withdrawing a government-sponsored intelligence community would leave a vacuum left to be filled by law enforcement agencies, the military or non-government entities. In some systems, the combination of law enforcement and intelligence operations is not seen in a negative light; in others, the public would never allow it. The consequences of the promotion of non-state-affiliated or foreign intelligence services filling that void would be significantly detrimental to the host country. It would also be easy to see how diplomats might fall into the role of intelligence officers in this scenario – tainting the independence of the diplomatic mission.

Given the tremendous benefits – primarily, but not limited to, national security protection – it would behoove a country to maintain its intelligence community. Ultimately, intelligence has been around for thousands of years and every nation engages in some form of it. Not doing so blinds a nation to future events and potential threats.

Mitigating Future Events

It will never be possible to completely eliminate all risk involved in intelligence activities. If the goal is to avoid an exposed operation, no operations would take place. The intelligence community could produce estimates, but it would not engage in covert activities. Realistically, risk will never be eliminated from intelligence work.

However, it is possible to mitigate the induced risk stemming from intelligence activities. The first line of defense is to not approve operations in or dealing with politically sensitive issues. To assist in bolstering this effort to not undertake risky operations, a nation could work to improve its diplomatic and military services, and work with the host country or neighboring countries to address a common threat that all have some vested interest in redressing. A nation could also work through international institutions or attempt to convince another country to do the dirty work.

A second way to mitigate risk is to provide robust plausible deniability in all intelligence activities. Naturally, this has been a requirement in covert operations for as long as covert operations have existed. However, increasing the layers between the sensitive activity and the country responsible for it only reduces the odds that it will be traced back to the responsible nation.

Third, a country can utilize the moral high ground in a conflict. In the Cold War, the U.S. stood for freedom while the Soviet Union represented repression. When people who had previously lived free saw their country invaded, occupied and become a pawn of the Kremlin, the U.S. could claim the moral authority. This credence greatly enhanced its margin of error and in effect, its capabilities by attracting allies and promoting the cause that most people, even if they did not agree with the tactic, could empathize with and support the overarching cause.

A fourth option to help mitigate risk would be to ensure analytical objectivity. As Jervis discussed in the Journal of Strategic Studies, analysis must be free of politicization, groupthink, excessive consensus, confirmation bias, over-learning, insufficient imagination, a failure to challenge assumptions, among other errors. Ensuring estimates are purged of bias can help mollify the odds that a mismatch will be created between perception and reality.

Fifth, laws can be enacted and oversight can be implemented. This measure would help restrain “good” agencies from running afoul of their mandate and eases public concern. A combination of internal and external oversight would serve as a check on an agency’s power and activities.

In conclusion, intelligence, a world shrouded in secrecy, can greatly benefit a nation and enhance the decision-making process of foreign policy. This however does not come without the drawbacks and risks involved in intelligence activities, although careful planning can mitigate negative effects. While risky, the costs of not performing intelligence operations are almost certainly far greater. Ultimately, intelligence is one of many tools of policy that facilitates – but cannot guarantee – good governance.

Bibleography:

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