The pace of post-Soviet development has been painfully slow in some countries, nowhere more so than in Russia itself. While Russia’s economy failed in the 1990s, many considered political reforms to still be ‘transition,’ but with the re-emergence of Russia as a world power, many people are now wondering why Russia still does not appear fully democratic. In truth, Russia is not a democracy, not even an “illiberal” one. The lack of political and civil rights, control of the army and security apparatus by the Kremlin, the corporatism and corruption of the Oligarchs and government and the exclusion of opposition parties from elections and political participation all indicate a system which is fundamentally undemocratic. The more pressing question, therefore, is whether Russia is a post-totalitarian form of government (indicating that these problems are legacies of the Soviet state and could be solved in time), or whether Russia, as Politkovskaya argues, is sliding back into full unchanging authoritarianism (Politkovskaya 2004).
Democratisation theory and theory of democracy does not offer any clear distinctions on how we can characterize a democracy. However, there are some commonly accepted features of any liberal democracy, beginning with the idea of representative government (direct or indirect) and free and open elections. These free elections require democracies to have some other features, such as freedom to form political parties, freedom of speech, a free press, and rule of law in elections and civil society. Finally, civilian control of the army and security apparatus is seen as essential in a functioning democracy. Many people argue that in order to be a democracy, a country must provide their people with both political and civil liberties. Voting rights are not that representative in a system where basic civil rights are not respected. It is often hard to tell whether societies which meet some or all of these criteria are true democracies, for example, many authoritarian governments fake elections or install false opposition parties. If we look at the recent example of Zimbabwe, one can see how a fair and free election can be subverted through the violence of a non-democratic government.
Robert Dahl, in his work Polyarchy argues that it is essentially impossible for any state to achieve true representative democracy, and that most nations instead achieve a state of “polyarchy,” or partial democracy. Under this system, mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice and some citizens are excluded from voting (Dahl 1971). In recent years, some scholars have taken the idea of partial democracy even further, with theories about illiberal or ‘delegative’ democracies. The term illiberal democracy, coined by Fareed Zakaria, is often used in a negative connotation to describe a democracy that has gone wrong or failed. In an illiberal democracy, governments are elected but are usually authoritarian in nature between elections, often prohibiting freedom of speech and the press. In effect, an illiberal democracy is one where democratic structures and processes exist, but government does not conform to the image of a typical western liberal democracy and does not respect civil liberties (Zakaria 1997). The idea of ‘delegative’ democracy is similar. Popularised by O’Donnell, this system is democratic, but lacks many of the accountability or strong institutions of a democratic system. The executive is often overly strong, but is held in check by free elections, and accountability to the electorate (O’Donnell 1986). In both these systems, we see weak democratic principles and a lack some basic freedoms, yet the process of elections and accountability occurs. There are many other types of democratic government, but these are the two that are most relevant to the case of Russia.
Russia is not a democracy, neither liberal or illiberal, although these terms have often been applied to it. Indeed, Freedom House’s report on Russia (2007) argues that Russia is continuing a downward spiral towards authoritarianism, removing freedoms and civil liberties from the population on a regular basis. In addition, to the lack of civil and political rights for the average citizen, government control of the army and the security services is a further indication of a country which is not truly democratic (Freedom House 2007). Inequality is also a problem, and corruption within the bureaucracy, and government involvement with big business and the ‘oligarchs’ further reduces the democratic nature of the government. Finally, the Kremlin’s assault on basic political rights became much stronger last year as opposition parties were excluded from elections, and numerous voting frauds were reported. This last fact is what distinguishes Russia from the illiberal or delegative democracy; even in those systems, political rights are largely respected.
In their 2007 report, Freedom House discusses the ongoing lack of civil liberties in Russia, and the newer lack of political freedoms which is beginning to become widespread. Freedom of the press is declining, as the Kremlin puts more and more pressure on non-government media outlets. Those that do print criticisms of the government often face trumped up criminal charges or even attempts on their lives. The criminal system is heavily flawed, with corrupt judges, and very little independent due process. Government has the ability to influence trials, and protect those it supports from justice; Rule of Law is weak and the judiciary is powerless to combat this. Although the right to assemble is still in effect, the Kremlin tends to crackdown on groups which oppose it, either through criminal charges, or laws prohibiting these groups. Civil liberties are therefore subordinate to the needs of the government in Russia (Freedom House 2007). Political rights are also suffering setbacks, as the Kremlin cracks down on opposition parties. A new law requiring 7% of the vote for any party to enter parliament removes many opposition parties, while larger opposition groups are being removed from ballots and official elections charged with ‘election irregularities’ (BBC News 2005).
The journalist Anna Politkovskaya, in her book Putin’s Russia, condemns the Russian government as undemocratic. Politkovskaya herself was shot and killed by men suspected of links to the Russian security services, and her murderers have yet to be brought to justice (BBC News 2007). While not the only murder of a harsh critic of the state, Politkovskaya’s writings were among the most critical of the Kremlin, and her descriptions show many of the factors which remove Russia from the category of ‘democracy.’ She is perhaps best known for her strident descriptions of the behavior of the army and security services during the Chechen war, reporting on torture and the suffering of ordinary people, who she believed were being drawn into a war the Kremlin sought for political reasons. The army, she argues, is largely autonomous, with no oversight, even from those who are mean to be its’ political masters (Politkovskaya 2004). This has led to brutal hazing and beatings in the army, as well as torture and horrific tactics in its campaigns in Chechnya. The security services, likewise, operate without oversight, though not necessarily without direction from above. The ability of the army and security services to get away with horrific crimes is one result of Russia’s undemocratic system. There is no way for such crimes to be punished in a system where politicians cannot be held responsible for the actions of the police, army and security apparatus.
Politskovskaya also discusses the corruption which is endemnic in Russia. She laments the citizens forced to pay protection to the Vorii v-Zakone, the mafia bosses who provide “protection” to small business owners. Her populist stories illustrate a situation which even at the top level shows the extreme penetration of corruption into every level of society. The corruption of the Russian government is another sign of an undemocratic regime; the corporatism of the energy companies and their control over the government signals the control of government by a small group of unelected officials. Indeed, Dmitry Medvedev, newly become president of Russia, is president of Gazprom, the largest of the state-owned energy conglomerates. The so-called “Oligarchs” wield immense political power in today’s Russia (Klebnikov 2000), and corruption among these businessmen is widespread. Yet another sign of a non-democratic regime, these oligarchs are immune from prosecution for their crimes unless they do something politically inadvisable. One recent example, Khodorkovsky, former head of Yukos, was found guilty of corruption charges after angering the government (BBC News 2004). The corruption and freedom from prosecution that the oligarchs enjoy, the trumped-up charges for those who criticise the Kremlin, and the corporatist links between state and energy conglomerates all indicate a government which is profoundly undemocratic.
Recent political developments have further shown Russian democracy to merely be a front. Last year’s legislative and presidential elections were both heavily criticized by internal opposition parties and outside observers for being biased, unfair, and in some cases, rigged. The 2005 law on elections mandated that only parties which obtained more than 7% of the vote could enter the Duma, and coalitions were not permitted to clear this number (BBC News 2005). As a result, only four parties obtained entry, three of which were largely pro-Putin, and the other being the communist party. The elections were characterized by secrecy, and a large number of results were suspiciously high. Indeed, the OSCE issued a statement arguing that:
“…[the elections] took place in an atmosphere which seriously limited political competition, and with frequent abuse of administrative resources, media coverage strongly in favour of the rule party, and an election code whose cumulative effect hindered political pluralism.” (OSCE 2007)
The 2007 Presidential elections, held shortly thereafter, had fewer problems with contested results, but the candidate list was kept artificially truncated by bureaucratic rules on registration of candidates. Candidates such as Kasyanov, Bukosky and Kasparov were all removed from the official candidates list due to ‘irregularities’ with their official registration as candidates (Tirmaste 2008). There were also criticisms that media was heavily biased towards the Kremlin’s favoured candidate. In short, elections in the last year have merely proven what other evidence has suggested: Russia is not a democratic system of governance. Putin’s virtual appointment of his own successor and the liklihood that he will become Prime Minister only confirm this hypothesis. Elections may take place, but they are unfair and biased towards incumbent parties. Therefore we can conclusively state that Russia is not a democracy, and lacks even the basic civil liberties and political rights such as freedom of the press, freedom to vote or autonomy of the army or security services which would class it as an illiberal or delegative democracy.
The central unanswered question here (if we accept Politkovskaya’s assertion that Russia is a failed democracy) is what form of governance Russia has become instead. Democratisation theory offers two realistic alternatives: post-totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Post-totalitarianism is a political system that has institutional, social, and economic pluralism. The leader obtains control through the party system and the party remains the central power in the state, through ideology declines (Linz 1996). This could indeed describe portions of the Russian experience, and Aslund argues in his 2001 article that many of Russia’s flaws are those of a country with a strong totalitarian past. He argues that problems with the economy and corruption, as well as the centralised party control is a legacy of the Soviet era, and that the Russian government is still in the process of reforming itself into a more democratic form of government, slowly coming to terms with the problems of the past (Aslund 2001). However, while this may have been an adequate explanation for Russia in the early part of the decade, with the benefit of hindsight it can be seen that Russia has become more illiberal in recent years. Russia’s declining civil rights, as well as the recent blows to political rights seen in the 2007 elections all indicate a system which is not in the process of being reformed and is not improving as time goes on.
The other alternative explanation is that Russia is an authoritarian regime, not unlike Franco’s Spain. In an authoritarian regime, there is little heterogeneity of political parties, and mobilization of the electorate is minimal. The official party controls all government activities, but civil society is usually freer than in a totalitarian system. (Linz 1996) In addition, a strong cult of personality often tends to spring up around the leader. This system seems to have strong parallels with Russia today: civil society is not nonexistent, but political motivation is low, and voters tend to vote for who they are told to. The supremacy of the party, and the corporatist leanings of the Kremlin all seem to fit well with authoritarian model of governance, as does Putin’s strong links to the army and security services, and his creation of a cult of personality. Russia seems in many ways to be an authoritarian regime, and most scholars seem to agree that even if it is not all the way there, Russia will reach authoritarianism in a short time.
In conclusion, Russia is no longer a democracy. While some of the 1990s may have been spent in an attempted democratic transition, and even early post-totalitarianism, Russia’s current government has morphed into an authoritarian regime. Political rights are being removed, as opposition parties are quashed. Putin, while regarding the letter of the law in stepping down as President, has consolidated power into the executive, and it seems likely that he will be back in a few years time. Civil liberties in Russia are weak, and freedom of the press in particular is in danger (Freedom House 2007). State control of the army, judiciary, and the corruption at the highest levels of government all show a system which is undemocratic. Recent elections sparking international condemnation confirm this idea. Russia, it seems, has returned to authoritarianism and Soviet-style governance without even the comfort of ideology it used to provide.
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