

Identifying Prerequisites for State Formation in Southern Africa

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The logic behind the “war making-state making” theory is both controversial and counterintuitive. The premise that, as Charles Tilly puts it, “war made the state, and the state made the war”¹ seems incompatible with the modern-day international setting. Accordingly, because the “war making-state making” theory was originally adopted as a paradigm of state building in early-modern Europe, some have sought to amend the theory to make it more applicable to the contemporary context, especially in reference to the developing world. This paper will examine one such “amendment,” put forth by Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea and offering a rather specific qualification to the “war making-state making” theory.

In general, the “war making-state making” theory hypothesizes that war motivates governments to extract resources from a specific territory, which requires coercion and repression of the population, which in turn leads to the development of coercive agencies and government institutions and consequently leads to the formation of a state.² Moreover, the presence of an external threat, it is argued, can increase social cohesiveness by mobilizing a population against an “outside enemy,” which in turn contributes to the strengthening of the state.³ As Michael C. Desch summarizes, “In short, war

¹ Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in *Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.

² *Ibid.*, 42; and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 12.

³ Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), 87-110; and Michael C. Desch, “War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” *International Organization* 50.2 (Spring 1996), 237-268, 237-250.

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and other external threats play an ongoing role in expanding the scope and maintaining the cohesion of many states.”⁴ However, in “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World,” Taylor and Botea contend that for war/external threats to precipitate the strengthening of a state, as the “war making-state making” theory posits, there are certain preconditions that must necessarily be present for this process to unfold. Taylor and Botea argue that the necessary preconditions for the “war making-state making” theory to hold are:

- the existence of a core ethnic group that had served as the basis for a relatively longstanding political community in the past;
- a combination of war and revolution, which inspired state officials and facilitated the promulgation of a unifying national ideology that combined nationalism with a powerful political ideology.⁵

Without these preexisting underpinnings of a socially cohesive population, war is predicted to have a weakening effect on a state.⁶ Conversely, according to the Taylor and Botea theory, the presence of a preexisting dominant ethnic group and a unifying national ideology allows a state, when faced by an external threat, to mobilize public support and unite the populace toward a common cause that subsequently enables revenue accumulation and military development, and precipitates the overall strengthening and viability of the state. The three causal mechanisms identified by Taylor and Botea for the “war making-state making” relationship are:

- the development of a state’s administrative structure, enabling the extraction and accumulation of financial resources from the population and economy;
- the creation of coercive agencies, especially militaries—in other words, a state must be able to develop armies that are stronger than those of its external rivals;
- the forging of strong national identities among the population.⁷

Therefore, this paper will analyze these “causal mechanisms” in three separate Southern African countries between the 1970s and 1980s and ultimately draw conclusions about the explanatory power of the Taylor and Botea theory in each respective case.

⁴ Desch 1996, 243.

⁵ Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World,” *International Studies Review* 10.1 (March 2008), 27–56, 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 33–34.

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In essence, this paper will seek to identify under what circumstances war/external threats might strengthen a state, and, conversely, under what conditions they might weaken a state. Although much of the “war making-state making” literature focuses on the external components of war, Taylor and Botea contend that successful state strengthening can also occur in the presence of internal conflict, provided that the aforementioned preconditions are met.⁸ Nevertheless, Taylor and Botea themselves acknowledge that the theoretical connection between internal conflict and state making is more tenuous, and that “the direction of causality between state capacity and contemporary civil war is murky at best.”⁹

While this paper will ostensibly be examining the validity of the “war making-state making” theory as a whole, it will more specifically focus on the aforementioned theory of Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea. To test the theory put forth by Taylor and Botea, the explanatory power of the theory will be analyzed using three separate cases in Southern Africa: Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana. This paper will analyze the effects of South Africa’s aggression toward these three “Frontline States” during the “total onslaught” period between the 1970s and 1980s. These three test cases are particularly useful because of their seemingly divergent outcomes when faced by a similar South African external threat during the late 1970s and 1980s, with Botswana emerging from this period a stronger and more viable state while Mozambique and Angola failed to follow suit. Therefore, the research question for this paper is: *Can the degree of preexisting ethnic homogeneity and presence of a post-revolutionary unifying national and political ideology definitively explain the disparate outcomes of these three countries when faced by an aggressive South Africa during the “total strategy” period of the 1970s and 1980s?*¹⁰

The next section of this paper will provide a contextual background of the threat posed by South Africa during this period. This will be followed by an examination of the three selected cases (Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana) and an overall assessment of the utility of the Taylor and Botea theory to explain the divergent outcomes in these three states. The examination of each case will be organized as follows: 1) a brief synopsis of the threat posed to the state; 2) an assessment of the state’s administrative capacity and ability to accumulate revenue; 3) an assessment of the development of the state’s armed forces; 4) an assessment of the degree of preexisting ethnic homogeneity, the revolution/struggle for independence, and the development of a post-independence national ideology; and finally 5) an analysis of the explanatory power of the Taylor and Botea theory.

⁸ Taylor and Botea 2008, 48–49.

⁹ Ibid., 32.

¹⁰ Note: Although Botswana did not experience a revolution in the traditional sense, at least not when compared to the military struggles that characterized the independence of Angola and Mozambique, the crux of the theory (the preexistence of a unifying national and political ideology) remains applicable because it entailed a liberation struggle and quest for independence from a colonial power, albeit without a drawn-out military conflict.

The findings of this research show a strong correlation between the preexisting degrees of ethnic homogeneity and unifying national ideology and the respective weakening/strengthening of the selected states — although the explanatory power for the case of Botswana appears to be limited by the fact that the development of the state deviates in some important respects from the traditional “Tillyan” model of state making. Also, in the cases of Mozambique and Angola, it is necessary to note that the nature of the threat posed to the respective states includes important variables that should be highlighted when examining the theoretical efficacy of the “war making-state making” paradigm. The extent to which these states faced a concurrent internal and external threat proved to have a significant effect on their state-making processes, as the degree of the internal threat undermined some of the most important aspects of the war-state making relationship. It seems likely, therefore, that the concurrent presence of a formidable internal threat may serve to mitigate some of the potential benefits that could otherwise result from the presence of an external enemy.

SETTING THE CONTEXT: SOUTH AFRICA’S “TOTAL STRATEGY” BETWEEN THE 1970S AND 1980S

The withdrawal of Portugal from its African colonies in the mid-1970s dramatically altered the strategic balance in Southern Africa and precipitated a change in South Africa’s regional security outlook. As Jonathan Farley comments, “the collapse of Portugal’s imperial position in Southern Africa raised African expectations of a significant political change and put South Africa itself on the strategic defensive vis-à-vis its immediate neighbors in a way it had not experienced before.”¹¹ Internal unrest was also brewing within South Africa as mass protests and increasingly bolder displays of popular discontent from the black majority were giving the white minority regime increasing cause for concern.¹² Collectively, these threats represented for South Africa a “total onslaught” that posed a significant risk to the continuity of the apartheid regime. As a response to this “total onslaught,” Prime Minister P.W. Botha adopted a “total strategy,” which was aimed at “[marshaling] all facets of Southern African society in a coordinated effort to thwart [the] externally-driven campaign to destroy the state.”¹³ Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in an attempt to neutralize these potential threats, the apartheid regime embarked on a campaign to destabilize neighboring Southern African countries that were deemed ideological threats or suspected of assisting African National Congress (ANC) rebel forces. Through

¹¹ Jonathan Farley, *Southern Africa: Making of the Contemporary World* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 118.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Republic of South Africa 1977, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Production* (Pretoria: Government Printers), 4–5, cited in Chris Alden, *Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 46–47.

the 1970s and 1980s, the apartheid regime's implementation of "total strategy" entailed supporting proxy insurgencies, launching full-scale attacks against the Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique, and conducting raids on suspected ANC bases in numerous neighboring countries.¹⁴ The aggressive foreign policy of South Africa during this span had dire consequences for the region as a whole, but especially for Mozambique and Angola. In the end, war served as an enormously destructive force for both of these states. By the end of the period of "total strategy," neither Mozambique nor Angola exhibited the characteristics of a fully functioning state. Botswana, on the other hand, had emerged from this period as one of the fastest-developing countries in the world.

EXAMINATION OF CASES

I. Mozambique

The newly independent Mozambican state posed both an ideological and security threat to the apartheid regime, as the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) government adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and provided support to ANC rebel forces. Consequently, South Africa adopted a two-pronged military strategy to mitigate the Mozambican threat: using the South African Defence Force (SADF) to launch conventional attacks against targets within Mozambique, even going so far as to initiate attacks in the capital of Maputo, and sponsoring the opposition insurgency, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). The South African-supported Renamo, which was originally developed as a proxy tool for the Rhodesian government, greatly destabilized Mozambique. Renamo terrorized the Mozambican population, targeting schools, health centers, government offices, and transport routes with the objective of destabilizing the economy, government, and country as a whole.¹⁵

Also, in addition to the threats posed by South Africa and Renamo guerrilla forces, Mozambique faced the threat of Rhodesian incursions during the mid- to late-1970s, with an estimated 350 attacks being launched by Rhodesian forces between 1976 and 1979.¹⁶ Consequently, by the late 1970s, Rhodesia was "seen as the enemy ... by the overwhelming majority of Mozambicans."¹⁷

¹⁴ Alden 1996, 46–48, 51; and Farley 2008, 51, 118–121.

¹⁵ Alden 1996, 108–112.

¹⁶ Hilary Anderson, *Mozambique: A War against the People* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 78.

¹⁷ Joao Paulo Borges Coelho and Paulino Macaringue, "The Role of Mozambique's Armed Forces in a Changing Security Context," in *Demilitarisation and Peace-building in Southern Africa*, vol. 3: *The Role of the Military in State Formation and Nation-building*, ed. Peter Batchelor, Kees Kingma, and Guy Lamb (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 41.

Administrative Capacity and Revenue Accumulation

Facing threats both internally (from Renamo) and externally (from South Africa, as well as from Rhodesia until 1980), government defense expenditures proved increasingly difficult to sustain. During the 1980s, an average of 38 percent of annual government spending was allocated for the defense budget, which required the government to divert state funds away from previously successful social projects.¹⁸ Extravagant defense expenditures accompanied by Frelimo's socialist "big-push" development strategies created unsustainable government spending, and greatly increased the country's debt.¹⁹ The destruction of the formal economy during the war, moreover, gave rise to what Mark Chingono describes as a "grassroots war economy." As the significance of an informal economy increased, it afforded the "bureaucratic and commercial elite" the opportunity to exploit the informal market conditions and accumulate massive personal wealth, thus diverting a large amount of would-be public resources.²⁰

Due to the ebb and flow of war and poor government policies, state revenues in post-independence Mozambique fluctuated significantly. In 1975, for instance, tax revenues were a mere 7.4 percent of GDP. In 1983, though, tax revenues accounted for 14.1 percent of GDP, only to fall back down to 8.0 percent by 1985.²¹ As a result of the internal war, by 1986 there had also been 100,000 people killed while close to one million had fled the country. Since Renamo attacks were directed towards key social infrastructure targets in rural areas of Mozambique, six million people were internally displaced.²² All of the above effectively eliminated a large portion of the state's potential tax base. At the time the fighting stopped in 1992, foreign aid comprised 50 percent of the government's total budget, and Mozambique was the most aid-dependent country in the world by 1993.²³

Development of Armed Forces

The Mozambican armed forces (the FADM) were a product of Frelimo's armed struggle against the Portuguese in the war for independence. After

¹⁸ Saferworld, *The True Cost of Conflict* (London: Macmillan, 1994), cited in Mark F. Chingono, *The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992* (Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1996), 76-77; and Coelho and Macaringue 2004, 44.

¹⁹ Roberto J. Tibana, "Mozambique commodity and policy shocks: terms of trade changes, the Socialist 'Big-Push', and the response of the economy (1975-1986)," Oxford University, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper Series Number 18 (1994), 1-2, 59.

²⁰ Chingono 1996, 77, 101.

²¹ Bruce Byiers, "Fiscal Policy and Tax Incidence: Post-Independence Tax Policy & Revenue Performance in Mozambique," *National Directorate of Studies and Policy Analysis. Ministry of Planning and Development. Republic of Mozambique*. Discussion papers, No. 39E, Chapter 3, April 2007.

Available at

http://www.mpd.gov.mz/gest/documents/chapterbook/Chap3_Taxation%20in%20retrospect.pdf, 7-8.

²² Chingono 1996, 77.

²³ Saferworld 1994, 88-89, cited in Chingono 1996, 77.

independence, the Frelimo government expected to (and indeed was) faced with aggression from South Africa and Rhodesia, both from direct military conflict as well as internal "infiltration." Mozambique's army as of 1975 (comprised of approximately 10,000 men) was thus viewed as inadequate to address the threats posed by South Africa and Rhodesia.²⁴ Exacerbating the security situation was the government's marginalization of many Mozambicans that had previously served in the Portuguese colonial army, which led to "many of them ... [crossing] the border and [offering] their services to Rhodesia in acting against the new government." Not only did these defectors eventually form the base of the Renamo opposition group, but their departure also "deprived the country of skilled nationals who could have played an important role in the development of a new regular army."²⁵

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 1980s, due to substantial assistance from the Soviet Union, the national army had been remade into a fully developed conventional military. And the implementation of universal conscription policies had grown the armed forces to approximately 70,000 strong.²⁶ Even so, despite a larger, better trained, and better equipped military, by 1982 it was apparent that due to substantial South African support for Renamo, which by that point had infiltrated nearly every part of the country, the state's existing military capabilities were insufficient. Recognizing its inability to defend against these internal and external threats, Frelimo was resigned to seek a diplomatic resolution with the signing of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in 1984. The Nkomati Accord bore little fruit, though, as South Africa redoubled its support for Renamo, which soon escalated the conflict into a full-fledged civil war. Throughout the rest of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Mozambican armed forces were unable to protect the population, and the effects of the civil war crippled the economy.²⁷ By this point, "the state was largely inoperative, and incapable of supporting an army that had grown immensely and needed resources that did not exist," while the inability of the state to quell the cycle of violence and destruction effectively dissolved any remaining "euphoria of independence."²⁸

Examination of Ethnic Homogeneity, Revolution, and Development of National Ideology

The population of Mozambique is made up of multiple ethnic groups, including the Makua, Tsonga, Makonde, Shangaan, Shona, Shena, and Ndau, which also feature many additional subgroups. To a significant degree, these ethnic groups are demarcated regionally and exhibit a variety of different

²⁴ Coelho and Macaringue 2004, 35, 39.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 39, 40.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 41–45.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

languages, cultural characteristics, and histories.²⁹ There is also a historical basis for hostility between the inhabitants of central and northern Mozambique and the southern (known as Shangaan) population. Even among fellow “southerners,” who faced subjugation from other tribes during the 1800s (and are themselves ethnically diverse), there have been periods of conflict and rivalry.³⁰

During twentieth-century colonial rule, due to significant flows of Mozambican migrant labor to South African mines, there was “little opportunity to create common cause and develop a stable class [or national] leadership.”³¹ By the 1960s, however, the first semblance of African nationalism had begun to emerge as a unifying anti-colonial sentiment helped assuage, at least temporarily, divisions among disparate groups and ideological rivals, the result of which led to the establishment of Frelimo in 1964.³² At the onset of the liberation campaign, Frelimo was strictly a national movement mobilized by one goal: liberating Mozambicans from colonial rule. By 1969, however, underlying Marxist-Leninist ideals within the movement began to meld with, and eventually superseded, the national ideology.³³

After achieving independence in 1975, Frelimo actively sought to create a unified society without cultural or social cleavages. Frelimo embarked on a campaign to establish national unity and party allegiance and eliminate fragmentation stemming from political or tribal differences. Frelimo instituted “re-education” programs and used extensive propaganda in an attempt to “break with the past” and create a post-colonial Marxist society that was bereft of “traditional” or “feudal” practices.³⁴ However, as Hilary Anderson asserts, “intending to unify a country is not the same as actually doing it,” and in fact many of the government’s post-independence decisions gave rise to a significant amount of anti-Frelimo sentiment among portions of the Mozambican population.³⁵

By 1980, the South African-backed Renamo opposition forces were wreaking havoc on Mozambique, terrorizing the population and severely destabilizing the economic and social functions of the country. By this point, Anderson notes, Mozambicans were generally more concerned with survival

²⁹ “Background Note: Mozambique,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7035.htm> (accessed 04/14/09).

³⁰ Joao M. Cabrita, *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 21–23.

³¹ David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 1992), 17.

³² *Ibid.*, 18, 53–54.

³³ Anderson 1992, 23–24.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 27, 29; and Jocelyn Alexander, “The Local State in Post-War Mozambique: Political Practice and Ideas about Authority,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 67.1 (1997), 1–26, 2.

³⁵ Anderson 1992, 31.

than allegiance to any political ideology.³⁶ Moreover, in the decades following independence, the Frelimo government was ineffective in providing resources, security, or governance in many rural areas, forcing citizens to rely on alternative institutions such as religious congregations, traditional authorities, and even neighboring states. As a result, Frelimo was unsuccessful in constructing unified ideological or political identities due in large part to a lack of state legitimacy and insufficient carryover of institutional cultures during the period of rapid political transformation in post-independence Mozambique.³⁷

Explanatory Power of the Taylor and Botea Theory

In the case of Mozambique, war clearly did not lead to the strengthening of the state. The government was unable to extract sufficient resources to fund the war and was also unable to create a military capable of protecting against internal and external rivals. The question, then, is to what extent the level of preexisting ethnic homogeneity and degree of post-revolutionary ideology, in accordance with the Taylor and Botea theory, can definitively explain the weakening of the Mozambican state when confronted by South Africa's "total strategy." As the previous analysis indicates, Mozambique did not exhibit a high degree of preexisting ethnic homogeneity, nor was the Frelimo government able to inculcate the masses with a unifying national ideology capable of eliminating social fragmentation. To a significant extent then, the lack of preexisting ethnic homogeneity and the absence of a unifying ideology can in fact assist in explaining the detrimental effect that war had on post-independence Mozambique. For starters, the failure to cultivate a post-independence national ideology that could unify and include disparate groups in the country led to the marginalization of sections of the population, which subsequently made Mozambique vulnerable to external predation. The lack of a unified political community allowed for the external interference (first from Rhodesia and then South Africa) that led to the creation and support for the Renamo opposition. As Anderson comments, Rhodesians "had long ago learned that black disunity was the most effective weapon in any African war."³⁸ Therefore, based on this assessment, the case of Mozambique appears to corroborate the Taylor and Botea theory in that a lack of ethnic homogeneity and unifying ideology allowed for external predation and the emergence of a formidable internal enemy. In other words, the ethnic and ideological disunity within Mozambique appears to have

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

³⁷ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "O Estado Heterogeneo e o Pluralismo Juridico," in *Conflito e Transformação Social: Uma Paisagem das Justicas em Moçambique*, ed. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Joao Carlos Trindade (Porto, Portugal: Edicoes Afrotamento), vol. 1, 47-95, 65-67, 79-80, cited in Pekka Virtanen, "Tradition, Custom, and Otherness: The Politics of Identity in Mozambique," *Identities: Global Studies in Power and Culture* 12.2 (April-June 2005), 223-248, 242; and Virtanen, "Tradition, Custom, and Otherness," 242-245.

³⁸ Anderson 1992, 49.

done much to facilitate the weakening of the state between the 1970s and 1980s.

It is also important to emphasize that, in the case of Mozambique, the degree of the internal threat represented by Renamo seems to have done much to undercut any potential benefits that could have resulted from the existence of an external threat. It is highly plausible that the degree of the dual threat (both internal and external) mitigated any potential social cohesion or consequent state strengthening that could have otherwise taken place during this period. Although South Africa represented a conventional external threat, the concurrent destabilization strategies of Renamo decimated the Mozambican economy, dispersed local populations, and inhibited the state's ability to accumulate revenue. In other words, Renamo's destabilization was essentially targeting and undermining the very aspects of the state that are at the core of the Tillyan "war making-state making" process: the "consolidation of territorial control" and extraction of revenues from the population.³⁹ Also, in regard to the idea that a common external threat will create a more cohesive population, it is likely that Mozambicans had a greater concern for the more proximate internal threat (from Renamo) than any external threat from an aggressive South Africa or Rhodesia. In sum, Mozambique clearly bears the characteristics of a state that the Taylor and Botea theory would predict to be weakened by war. Moreover, the dual nature and degree of the threat (especially the internal threat of Renamo, which was facilitated by the characteristics of a fragmented society) seems to have played a significant role in the lack of state formation during the 1970s and 1980s.

II. Angola

As in the case of Mozambique, the Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in Angola was viewed as an ideological and regional security threat to the South African apartheid regime. Driven by the desire to install a more favorable, non-communist regime in Angola, South Africa launched its first full-scale incursion into the country in 1975. Although South Africa's early attempt to capture the Angolan capital was unsuccessful, it served as a sign of things to come. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s SADF forces orchestrated large-scale attacks into Angola and intermittently occupied and maintained a strong military presence in parts of southern Angola until the late 1980s.⁴⁰ Furthermore, South Africa also began providing substantial support to the

³⁹ Tilly 1975, 70-73.

⁴⁰ Rialize and Ian Liebenberg Ferreira, "The Impact of War on Angola and South Africa: Two Southern African Case Studies," *Journal for Contemporary History* 31.3 (2006), 42-73, 46-47; James D. Sidaway and David Simon, "Geopolitical Transition and State Formation: The Changing Political Geographies of Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19.1, Special Issue: *Namibia: Africa's Youngest Nation* (March 1993), 6-28, 9; and Christopher Pycroft, "The Forgotten Tragedy," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20.2 (June 1994), 241-262, 243-244.

anti-communist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla forces, which was eventually transformed into a full conventional army that did much to devastate Angola's social and economic infrastructure.⁴¹

Administrative Capacity and Revenue Accumulation

Although the MPLA government attempted to establish a Marxist-Leninist centralized administrative structure, by the early 1980s incursions by South African and UNITA forces had effectively separated large portions of south and southeast Angola from the administrative reach of the state.⁴² Similar to the case of Mozambique, the post-independence war in Angola resulted in significant displacement of the population. By 1992, in addition to at least 500,000 people killed, one third of the population had fled the country or been internally displaced, with many leaving the fertile countryside and seeking refuge in overcrowded urban areas.⁴³ The Angolan government therefore became increasingly dependent on oil as its primary source of revenue, as the effects of the war led to a "gradual collapse of Angola's land-based economy ... which left the government with little else to tax."⁴⁴ As of 1992,⁴⁵ 75.2 percent of the government's revenue came from the country's oil resources, equaling (US\$) 3,759 million.⁴⁶ Because Angola's oilfields are located primarily offshore, the oil sector came to represent an "economic sanctuary" for the MPLA government because it was largely shielded from attacks by UNITA rebel forces.⁴⁷ However, the country's other major natural resource, diamonds, was less dependable as a source of revenue for the government, as diamond mines were much more vulnerable to UNITA attacks and smuggling. Between 1981 and 1986, government diamond revenues fell from \$221 million to \$33 million, and by 1986 UNITA's revenues from smuggled diamonds had surpassed those of the government.⁴⁸ In the end, despite the government's monopoly on the country's oil revenues, the exorbitant costs of funding the war effort led to unsustainable spending and debt. By 1991, external debt had reached \$8,775 million and the dispropor-

⁴¹ Pycroft 1994, 243-244.

⁴² Sidaway and Simon 1993, 10.

⁴³ Pycroft 1994, 242; M.R. Bhagavan, "Survival Strategies for a Socialist State," *Economic and Political Weekly* 23.32 (August 6, 1988), 1630; and Michael L. Ross, "Booty Futures," *UCLA Department of Political Science Working Papers* (2005), 16.

⁴⁴ Ross 2005, p. 17.

⁴⁵ Due to a lack of transparency, insufficient recordkeeping, government corruption, and war-related disruptions, official economic data, such as that for the country's oil revenues, are highly variable and/or not readily available (especially prior to the 1990s).

⁴⁶ Data taken from table in Philippe Le Billon, "Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000," *African Affairs* 100 (2001), 55-80, 62.

⁴⁷ Le Billon 2001, 55-80, 63.

⁴⁸ Shawn H. McCormick, *The Angolan Economy: Prospects for Growth in a Postwar Environment*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), 30; Le Billon 2001, 55-80; and Ross 2005, 17.

tionate amount of resources allocated for defense expenditures effectively stunted the development of the state.⁴⁹

Development of Armed Forces

Much of the Angolan government's military capabilities depended on external support. When the MPLA assumed control of the government in 1975 by capturing the capital in Luanda, it did so with the backing of an estimated 15,000 to 36,000 Cuban troops (a third of these reportedly left by early 1977). Due to South Africa's invasion in 1975 and its backing of UNITA and National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) guerrilla forces, the MPLA was also forced to seek support from several thousand Katangese rebels from Zaire to bolster the MPLA's 10,000- to 12,000-man armed forces.⁵⁰

By the 1980s, UNITA forces had been rebuilt and strengthened as a result of significant support from South Africa and the United States. Direct military support and protection from South Africa allowed UNITA to establish a base in the southeast portion of Angola, which also served as a launching point for SADF incursions deep into the country. UNITA guerrillas, meanwhile, ravaged MPLA-controlled areas, terrorizing the local populations and infrastructure with the aim of "starving the peasants."⁵¹ Because of these precarious security developments, by the mid-1980s there were between 30,000 and 50,000 Cuban troops in Angola bolstering the MPLA's hold on the capital.⁵²

By the late 1980s, MPLA forces (with Cuban and Soviet backing) began launching offensives towards UNITA strongholds in southern Angola; to which South Africa responded by initiating a series of large-scale invasions that brought about the highest level of fighting since the war began. SADF and UNITA forces subsequently retaliated by orchestrating a siege of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987. Ultimately, a deployment of 10,000 Angolan troops, bolstered by a division and 40 tanks of the Cuban army, were able to force a military stalemate in the battle for Cuito Cuanavale, which dealt "a psychological defeat [to] the South African Defence Force."⁵³ The overall effect of this battle, though, was that it signaled to both South Africa and Cuba that the costs of direct military involvement in Angola had reached an unacceptable level due to the unlikelihood of a short-term, definitive military resolution.⁵⁴ By 1989, South African and Cuban troops had exited Angola and

⁴⁹ Angola Report, Economist Intelligence Unit (1993), 19, cited in Pycroft 1994, 244; and Bhagavan 1988, 1630.

⁵⁰ James Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa* (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2007), 131-132.

⁵¹ Birmingham 1992, 82, 84-85.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 85; and Alex Vines, "Angola: Forty Years of War," in Batchelor, Kingma, and Lamb, eds., 2004, 77.

⁵³ Assis Malaquias, *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post-Colonial Angola* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 41; and Vines 2004, 77.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Soviet assistance for the MPLA government had diminished, although U.S. support for UNITA continued. By 1990, it was clear that neither the government (at this point having an estimated 120,000-man army) nor UNITA (with an estimated 65,000) could exact a definitive victory over the other side, which laid the groundwork for a tenuous peace agreement in 1991. However, a new round of civil war erupted again shortly thereafter.⁵⁵

Examination of Ethnic Homogeneity, Revolution, and Development of National Ideology

The population of Angola is comprised of three main ethnic groups – the Ovimbundu, Mbundu, and Bokango – as well as various smaller sub-groups. Dating as far back as its early encounters with Europeans, the degree of ethnic fragmentation has long been a source of weakness for Angola. A lack of unity among the indigenous population inhibited their ability to mount a formidable resistance against Portuguese colonizers.⁵⁶ Moreover, the footprint left by colonial rule exacerbated internal ethnic fissures by “forcibly binding different ethnic groups into one centrally administered territory,” which, in the case of Angola, “led to the politicization of ethnicity as different ethnic groups retreated into primordial constructs for cultural, if not political, self-preservation.”⁵⁷ As Assis Malaquias comments, this “set the stage for a very problematic process of state building in Angola.”⁵⁸

The ethnic and cultural fragmentation among Angolans was also manifested in divisions within the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. The liberation war in Angola was separated into three distinct nationalist movements that were divided almost entirely along ethnic lines, with the MPLA representing the Mbundu, UNITA representing the Ovimbundu, and FNLA representing the Bokango ethnic group. In addition to rigid ethnic demarcations between the three liberation movements, there were also initial divisions rooted in class, race, overall motivations, and ideological differences – all of which prevented these nationalist groups from becoming a unified opposition movement against the Portuguese colonial rulers. Ethnic and ideological divides inevitably remained significant factors in fomenting post-independence division and conflict.⁵⁹

Ethnic and ideological divisions between the three nationalist groups in Angola also opened the door for significant external intervention. The Marxist-Leninist MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, the anti-

⁵⁵ Vines 2004, 78; and Pycroft 1994, 244–248.

⁵⁶ Malaquias 2007, 23–25.

⁵⁷ Assis Malaquias, “Ethnicity and Conflict in Angola: Prospects for Reconciliation,” in *Angola’s War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000). Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=29&slink_id=218&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmp_l_id=3, 95.

⁵⁸ Malaquias 2007, 25.

⁵⁹ Malaquias 2000, 96, 103, 105.

communist UNITA was backed by South Africa and the United States, and the FNLA was backed by China and Zaire. Moreover, at the time of independence, because the three nationalist movements were ethnically and regionally based, Angola was ostensibly divided into three separate governments, with the MPLA controlling the capital in Luanda, UNITA controlling various southern provinces as well as the second largest city of Huambo, and the FNLA controlling the northern provinces.⁶⁰ Needless to say, this would make it nearly impossible for the MPLA government to promulgate any kind of unifying national ideology. In general, because most of Angola's political power and wealth was concentrated within the capital region and amongst the Mbundu ethnic group, many Angolans viewed the state as an illegitimate ruling power, and the message of the MPLA government generally did not resonate with any Angolans outside of the Luanda region.⁶¹ Furthermore, because the post-independence MPLA leadership was also comprised of many urban, elitist, and European-educated intellectuals, many Angolans believed that the MPLA "had little understanding of and connection with the vast majority of the Angolan people."⁶² Even among the Mbundu ethnic group of the Luanda capital region, the makeup of the party's ruling elite created a somewhat ambivalent allegiance to the state leadership and led even Mbundus to question government legitimacy.⁶³

Explanatory Power of the Taylor and Botea Theory

In the case of Angola, as in Mozambique, war obviously did not lead to the strengthening of the state. Angola had virtually no ability to extract taxes directly from the population, but rather relied almost exclusively on the country's offshore oil resources as the means to fund the war effort. Despite maintaining a monopoly on the country's oil revenues, the government was unable to sustain the exorbitant costs of war. Also, while the MPLA government developed an army capable of consolidating control over the capital during the 1970s and 1980s, albeit with considerable Cuban and Soviet military assistance, it did not have the ability to defend its borders from either South African invasions or UNITA's destabilization efforts. Again, the question therefore is whether or not the Taylor and Botea theory can explain the lack of state strengthening in the case of Angola. There appears to be a strong correlation between the lack of ethnic homogeneity and national ideology with the weakening of the Angolan state. As the Taylor and Botea theory would presuppose in the case of a state weakened by war, Angola clearly exhibited a significant degree of ethnic disunity and ideological fragmentation. Of the three cases examined in this paper, Angola provides the clearest example of the disintegrative effects that war can have, as hy-

⁶⁰ Malaquias 2007, 38–39.

⁶¹ Malaquias 2000, 105.

⁶² Ciment 2007, 11; and Malaquias 2000, 103.

⁶³ Malaquias 2000, 107.

pothesized by the Taylor and Botea theory, on a state that lacks preexisting ethnic homogeneity or any semblance of a unifying national ideology. The severe divisions that were manifest within Angola's liberation struggle gave an early indication of the vulnerabilities that would plague the post-independence state.

To an even greater extent than Mozambique, the ethnic and ideological divisions within Angola invited the intervention of external powers. South Africa was able to exploit this ethnic disunity to pursue its goal of destabilizing and attempting to remove (though unsuccessfully) the Marxist government from Luanda. Furthermore, because the post-independence state was so clearly divided along ethnic lines, the administrative reach of the government was largely confined to the capital region, thus making it nearly impossible to pursue the same kind of "coercion" and "extraction"⁶⁴ from the population that served as the basis for administrative development and state formation as described in a Tillyan model of state making.⁶⁵ In this way, the lack of preexisting ethnic homogeneity in Angola seems to corroborate the Taylor and Botea theory in that it worked to prevent a key aspect of the "war making-state making" process: coercion and extraction.

As in the case of Mozambique, it is also necessary to emphasize the nature of the threat faced by the Angolan state. Although Angola faced an even more pronounced conventional threat from South Africa (which effectively annexed a portion of Angola during the 1970s and 1980s) than Mozambique, the existence of a concurrent internal threat from UNITA likely mitigated any potential for a "war making-state making" process to unfold. Again, this represents an important variable in the case of Angola when examining the theoretical relationship between the presence of an external threat and the strengthening of the state as hypothesized by the "war making-state making" theory, as the presence and degree of the UNITA internal threat appears to have done much to undermine this type of state-building process.

III. Botswana

Upon achieving independence in 1966, Botswana was trapped in the middle of regional turmoil and its borders were directly threatened by spillover violence from neighboring Rhodesia, Angola, and South West Africa (now Namibia), in addition to the threats posed by South Africa. Due to the size and relative weakness of Botswana's police force, neighboring military forces and insurgents habitually violated its borders. By the mid-1970s, Botswana was facing frequent attacks orchestrated by Rhodesian security forces seeking to capture or kill "anti-Rhodesian dissidents." Rhodesian forces made little effort to differentiate between insurgents and local citizens, as reports

⁶⁴ Tilly 1992, 20-21.

⁶⁵ This is an aspect discussed in respect to Latin America in Miguel A. Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," *American Journal of Sociology* 102.6 (1997), 1565-1605.

abound of harassment, property damage, kidnapping, murder, and rape of local Batswana.⁶⁶ Also, the threat from South Africa had increased by the late 1970s as South African forces launched incursions into Botswana targeting “anti-apartheid dissidents” and orchestrating numerous assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings within the country’s borders that resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians.⁶⁷

In the early 1980s, there was growing concern about the potential for a South African intervention into Botswana.⁶⁸ The perceived threat from an increasingly aggressive South Africa became especially pronounced by the mid-1980s when the apartheid regime, as part of a South African-proposed “non-aggression pact,” was mulling the idea of establishing a SADF station along the Botswana border, which gave rise to the fear that this would “... make us [Botswana] lose out [sic] independence since South Africa would use it as a pretext for invading”⁶⁹ Botswana’s fears reached an apex in June 1985 when South African forces launched an attack into the country, purportedly against ANC safe havens, which resulted in twelve Batswana deaths and the wounding of six others.⁷⁰

Administrative Capacity and Revenue Accumulation

At the time of independence in 1965, Botswana was heavily dependent on foreign aid, with 57% of government revenues coming from British grants. Botswana continued to benefit from a significant amount of foreign grants until the 1990s.⁷¹ It was the discovery of mineral deposits (especially diamonds) in the late 1960s, though, that led to a dramatic increase in government revenues and laid the foundation for Botswana’s rapid post-independence growth.⁷² In 1971/72 diamond revenues accounted for only 5.3% of the government budget. In 1979/1980, though, diamond revenues accounted for 36.1% of the government budget. Then, in 1985/86, diamond

⁶⁶ Dan Henk, “The Botswana Defence Force: Evolution of a Professional African Military,” *African Security Review* 13.4 (2004), 1; H. Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War* (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1993), 114, 136, cited in Henk 2004, 1; and Bonolo Simon Ditirwa, “The Role of the Military in State Formation and Nation-Building in Botswana,” in Batchelor, Kingma, and Lamb, eds., 2004, 21.

⁶⁷ Mpho G. Molomo, “Civil-Military Relations in Botswana’s Developmental State,” *African Studies Quarterly* 5.2 (2001), 5.

⁶⁸ Richard Dale, “Not Always so Placid a Place: Botswana under Attack,” *African Affairs* 86.342 (January 1987), 73-91, 74-79.

⁶⁹ Quote of Botswana President Quett Masire. Quote taken from Bishy Mmusi and Batshane Ndaba, “Botswana Sees No Need for Peace Accord,” *Daily News* (Gaborone), 14 May 1984, cited in Dale 1987, 75-76.

⁷⁰ Dale 1987, 78-79.

⁷¹ Charles Harvey, ed., Happy Siphambe, and Eagilwe Segosebe, “Botswana: Globalisation, Liberalisation and Sustainable Human Development. Country Assessment Study.” UNDP, February 2000. Available at: <http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/new/>, 43.

⁷² Pono Frank, “Botswana,” International Comparisons of Taxation in Developing Countries. Keio University. 2000 Research Papers, no. 5, 2.

Identifying Prerequisites for State Formation in Southern Africa

revenues made up 53.2% of the total government budget.⁷³ Botswana's substantial mineral revenues allowed the government to begin running budget surpluses by the mid-1970s, and from 1980 to 1989 Botswana averaged a budget surplus of 7.7% of GDP.⁷⁴ In addition to dramatic increases in mineral revenue, the government also benefited from increasing revenues from other tax sources such as sales tax (starting in 1982) and customs union revenue, which grew substantially after the renegotiation of the South African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement in 1969, with Botswana's customs revenues more than doubling between 1984/85 and 1988/89.⁷⁵

The government also gained revenues from income taxes, which, as of 1992, accounted for 11% of total government revenue.⁷⁶ Ann Persson posits that the Botswana post-independence policies of "assimilation," in which the government sought to deemphasize ethnic divisions and absorb minority ethnic and political groups into the Tswana majority group culture, allowed for a "stronger sense of a shared national identity and, consequently, a ... greater ability to collect income taxes" due to a willingness to comply with state tax structures.⁷⁷ Because of this, as Persson asserts, Botswana was able to develop "one of the most effective ... tax systems of all the former British colonies in the region."⁷⁸ Furthermore, the nature of British colonial rule, often characterized as "benign neglect,"⁷⁹ also allowed for the preservation of pre-colonial Tswana state/political culture, which expected adherence to the state and provided a basis for early revenue accumulation.⁸⁰ Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson also emphasize the fact that Botswana benefited from relatively strong institutions that were left behind from the Protectorate period and subsequently incorporated into the post-independence state.⁸¹

Development of Armed Forces

Botswana did not develop a national military for over a decade following independence. Due to a lack of adequate funds, Botswana's leadership was resigned to rely upon a Police Mobile Unit in lieu of a conventional military until the late 1970s. By the mid-1970s, however, the government was com-

⁷³ C. Harvey and S.R. Lewis, *Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana* (Bristol: Macmillan and OECD Development Centre, 1990), 111.

⁷⁴ D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, "An African Success Story: Botswana," Working Paper, MIT (Cambridge, MA, 2001). Available at: <http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/284>, 19; and Harvey, Siphambe, and Segosebe 2000, 39.

⁷⁵ Frank 2000, 28-29.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Anna Persson, "The Sources of Variation in Empirical Statehood: The impact of assimilation and ethnic group rights on patterns of taxation in a sub-Saharan African comparative perspective," *The Quality of Government Institute. Working Paper Series 2008: 15*, pp. 4, 26, 29.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁹ See, for instance, Richard Dale, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995).

⁸⁰ Zibani Maundeni, "State Culture and Development in Botswana and Zimbabwe," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40.1 (March 2002), 105-132, 109-110, 116, 119, 126.

⁸¹ Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson [henceforth AJR] 2001, 2-6, 32.

pelled to reverse its decision due to a growing number of military incursions from neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa, as well as cross-border encroachments by military and insurgent forces involved in conflicts in Angola and Namibia. In 1977, the government established the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), which by the end of the year was comprised of approximately 600 soldiers and was tasked with the primary duty of "protecting Botswana's territorial integrity."⁸² In 1978, the "Lesoma Incident," which involved a Rhodesian ambush on Botswana territory that left 15 Botswana soldiers dead, served as a watershed moment for the BDF and impelled the government to pursue a dramatic increase in the state's armed forces.⁸³ Between 1980 and 1987, Botswana's defense spending grew by 530%. As a result of South Africa's increasing destabilization efforts and incursions across Botswana's borders in the mid-1980s, there was a dramatic increase in military expenditures, from 4.0% of total government spending in 1986 to 7.6% in 1987.⁸⁴ By 1988, the BDF had burgeoned to 6,000 members; was augmented by U.S., Soviet, and British-made weaponry and vehicles; and was receiving military training from the U.S., Britain, Canada, and India. Even so, the BDF was often overmatched by the multitude of threats infiltrating the country's long borders and was generally relegated to merely attempting to bolster border security as well as guard against criminals and armed poachers. Needless to say, by the end of the 1980s, the 6,000-man BDF did not possess the manpower or military capabilities to mount a serious defense against an aggressive South Africa were it to decide to invade.⁸⁵

Examination of Ethnic Homogeneity, Revolution, and Development of National Ideology

According to official statistics, 80% of Botswana's population is classified as Tswana.⁸⁶ However, research by Neil Parsons suggests that probably less than half of the population is actually ethnically Tswana.⁸⁷ The post-independence Botswana government's lack of official recognition for differing ethnic groups is emblematic of the efforts by state leaders to portray Botswana as having a homogenous and unified national culture. After achieving independence, the Botswana leadership sought to create a unified "Tswana nation" by integrating ethnic and political minorities into the majority Tswana group culture. Government policies such as the designation of Setswana as the only language used for media, education, and administration, as well as the outward promotion of Tswana cultural practices (and in

⁸² Henk 2004, 1; and Ditirwa 2004, 18.

⁸³ Henk 2004, 2.

⁸⁴ Ditirwa 2004, 26.

⁸⁵ Henk 2004, 2.

⁸⁶ "Background Note: Botswana," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm> (accessed 04/19/09).

⁸⁷ Neil Parsons, *Botswana History Index*. Department of History, University of Botswana, 1999. Available at: <http://ubh.tripod.com/bw/index.html>, 13.

some instances active exclusion or discrimination against non-Tswana cultural practices), were aimed at establishing a “One-Nation Consensus” that promoted a unified, homogenous, and cultural nationalism.⁸⁸ To a significant extent, the foundations for these policies have historical precedents that are rooted in pre-colonial Tswana culture.

As Parsons describes, the initial development of Tswana national culture can be seen as far back as the late eighteenth century when diverse ethnic groups were incorporated into the Tswana state structure. Interestingly, early social cohesion amongst the pre-colonial Tswana society has been attributed by some to the presence of common external enemies during the nineteenth century when the Tswana states were threatened by Zulu expansion during the early 1800s and from the Boers beginning in the 1830s.⁸⁹ As Thomas Tlou and Alec Campbell assert, “perhaps the most important result of the wars was the uniting of the Batswana against a common enemy ... [laying] the foundations for a future Republic of Botswana in which merafe (Tswana political community) recognize a common unity.”⁹⁰

As for the development of a “revolutionary” ideology, Scott Beaulier notes that after WWII when the British sought to combine Bechuanaland (modern-day Botswana) with their South African colony, the emergence of a strong “nationalist current” as well as the rise of active political parties that desired an independent state effectively forestalled the plan. As a result, by the 1960s, the British realized it was losing control of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and was resigned to grant independence to Botswana in 1965.⁹¹ Ultimately, although some degree of ethnic tension has existed in post-independence Botswana, the overall success of “assimilation” strategies has prevented significant ethnic-based conflict or political mobilization along ethnic lines to the extent that it would challenge the legitimacy of the state or undermine the established Batswana national identity.⁹² In fact, the government has made a concerted effort to promulgate the ideal of a culturally unified state by insisting on the labeling of all citizens simply as “Batswana,” and has largely been able to successfully “[present] a mono-ethnic identity to itself and to the world.”⁹³

⁸⁸ Persson 2008, 20–21; and Richard Werbner, *Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana: The Public Anthropology of Kalanga Elites* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 38.

⁸⁹ AJR, 2001, 11; and Parsons 1999, 4.

⁹⁰ Thomas Tlou and Alex Campbell, *A History of Botswana* (Gaborone: Macmillan, 1997), 170, quoted in AJR 2001, 11.

⁹¹ Scott A. Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical Role of Post-Colonial Policy,” *Cato Journal* 23.2 (Fall 2003), 227–240, 230.

⁹² Persson 2008, 25–26.

⁹³ Neil Parsons, “Unravelling History and Cultural Heritage in Botswana,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32.4 (December 2006), 667–682, 676.

Explanatory Power of the Taylor and Botea Theory

Botswana emerged from the period of South African aggression a much more viable state than Mozambique and Angola. As the previous analysis shows, Botswana exhibited a high degree of preexisting social cohesion as well as a unifying post-independence national ideology. It would appear, then, that the Taylor and Botea theory exhibits a fair degree of explanatory power for the successful state formation of post-independence Botswana. As discussed above, Botswana's socially cohesive population and unified nationality did in fact allow for greater revenue accumulation and compliance with administrative structures. Also, the lack of ethnic disunity in Botswana prevented the same kind of "external manipulation" on the part of South Africa that was seen in the cases of Mozambique and Angola.⁹⁴ However, although there appears to be a strong correlation between the preexisting conditions in Botswana and the strengthening of the state when faced by external threats during the 1970s and 1980s, there are a number of variables that limit the explanatory power of the theory to this case.

To begin with, when examining Botswana's state development from the perspective of the "war making-state making" hypothesis, it becomes clear that the strengthening of the Botswana state deviated to a large extent from the prototypical "Tillyan" model of state formation. For starters, by all accounts, the development of the post-independence Botswana state did not follow the same pattern of "violent" state formation involving government "coercion" or "clashes" with the population that is associated with Tilly's model of European state making. Also, due to the small size and limited capabilities of Botswana's 6,000-man military, it is apparent that the post-independence Botswana government did not in fact develop an army capable of defending its borders against external rivals. While the argument has been made that the BDF fulfilled a vital role for post-independence stability and state building in Botswana by helping to prevent a greater degree of foreign destabilization,⁹⁵ the fact that the state's armed forces did not actually have the ability to exert dominance over external rivals suggests that the case of Botswana is once again deviating from a traditional Tillyan model of state formation.

However, there is some evidence that Botswana's development was in fact spurred by the presence of external threats, some of which predated its independence. Neil Parsons and James Robinson contend that Tswana states, and later Botswana, engaged in "defensive development" in response to external threats such as the Boers, the British South Africa Company, and finally from the South African apartheid regime. They further argue, though, that the absence of actual warfare exemplifies that "political elites may find it in their own interest to build a state ... they do not necessarily have to be

⁹⁴ Dale 1987, 89.

⁹⁵ Ditirwa 2004, 28-29.

pushed by the threat of warfare.”⁹⁶ As the previous analysis shows, however, while Botswana did not engage in actual drawn-out warfare with South Africa, it was in fact faced with tangible external threats; first from Rhodesia, then from South Africa.

Therefore, it could be presumed that one of the most important factors for Botswana’s state strengthening, and divergence from the cases of Mozambique and Angola, is that it *was* in fact threatened and pushed towards development by the presence of an external threat, but it *did not* actually have to engage in a military conflict. This meant that the state was allowed to grow and prosper precisely because it did not have to experience the destructive wars that plagued its neighbors in Mozambique and Angola.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the Taylor and Botea theory, all three cases do appear, on their face, to exhibit a strong relationship between the preexisting degree of ethnic homogeneity and unifying national ideology on the one side and the overall effects of war/external threats on the making of a state on the other. The cases of Mozambique and Angola exhibited a high degree of ethnic fragmentation and were bereft of a unifying national ideology. The disintegrative effects of war for these states were readily apparent. The absence of preexisting ethnic homogeneity and a unifying ideology were significant underlying factors leading to the outbreak of internal wars in these cases, as these characteristics invited the external intervention of outside forces and allowed for the emergence of formidable internal threats. Moreover, as described above, the dual threat of internal and external enemies in Mozambique and Angola did much to undermine important aspects of the “war making-state making” process. In these cases, the presence of an internal enemy led to the displacement of large segments of the population and also effectively placed significant portions of the country’s territory outside the reach of the state, factors that inhibited these states’ ability to “consolidate territorial control” and extract revenues from the population, both of which are vital aspects of the “war making-state making” paradigm. Although Taylor and Botea do in fact contend that the utility of their theory can extend to both external and internal conflicts – arguing that “major warfare involving both internal and external opponents can serve to strengthen, rather than fracture, the state” when the aforementioned preconditions are present⁹⁷ – the cases of Mozambique and Angola nevertheless draw attention to a potentially important variable within the “war making-state making” model: that is, the combination of concurrent and formidable internal and external threats and their effect on state building. To be sure, the extent to which

⁹⁶ Neil Parsons and James A. Robinson, “State Formation and Governance in Botswana,” *Journal of African Economies* 15 (Supplement 1, 2006), 100–140, 106–107, 134–135.

⁹⁷ Taylor and Botea 2008, 48–49.

these states faced a concurrent internal and external threat greatly affected the state-making processes, as the degree of the internal threat served to undermine some of the most important aspects of the war-state making relationship that may have otherwise been put in motion by the presence of an external enemy.

As for Botswana, although this case displays the necessary preexisting characteristics, as identified by the Taylor and Botea theory, of a unified ethnic population and national ideology, it is important to highlight that Botswana appears not to have followed the traditional path of the “war making-state making” process, as there was not a progression of “violent” state formation or development of a military capable of defending against external rivals. It is problematic, therefore, to conclusively attribute the divergent outcome of Botswana to the successful manifestation of a “war making-state making” process. Consequently, an analysis of Botswana’s successful development likely requires examining other important factors that lay outside the traditional boundaries of the “war making-state making” theory. To be sure, alternative explanations for Botswana’s success abound. The most frequent explanations for the Botswana “anomaly” often include aspects such as effective state leadership;⁹⁸ prudent policy decisions that emphasized private ownership; the use of sound fiscal policies; substantial infrastructural development;⁹⁹ and the ability to attract foreign investment and Western assistance in the early post-independence period.¹⁰⁰ The fact that Botswana did not adopt the Marxist-Leninist policies of its neighbors is also often cited as a key reason for its success relative to its neighbors. While this may be true, Botswana’s rejection of a Marxist-Leninist ideology was most important because it meant that they did not become the targets of the same type of sustained destabilization strategies of the anti-communist South Africa experienced by Mozambique and Angola. Had Botswana adopted a Marxist-Leninist line similar to that of its Mozambican and Angolan neighbors, the threat, and impact, of South African intervention would have likely been more pronounced.

An overall assessment of the utility of the Taylor and Botea theory in respect to these three cases shows that the theory displays a good degree of explanatory power for Mozambique and Angola while the case of Botswana is less conclusive. In the end, although the preconditions examined in these three cases undoubtedly played a role in their divergent outcomes during the 1970s and 1980s, and in the cases of Mozambique and Angola in fact played a decisive role in the weakening of the state, the explanatory power of the Taylor and Botea theory in the case of Botswana is limited due to its deviation from some of the traditional characteristics of a Tillyan model of state formation. One final point to be made is that the findings of this paper

⁹⁸ See, for instance, Beaulier 2003.

⁹⁹ See AJR 2001, 80–119.

¹⁰⁰ Beaulier 2003, 234–236.

also draw attention to some possible avenues for future research in regard to the “war making-state making” paradigm; with one being the potential positive effects of an external threat on state building when there is an *absence* of actual drawn-out warfare (as in the case of Botswana),¹⁰¹ and the second being the effect of a concurrent internal and external threat on state making, which consequently can result in the disruption of important aspects of the Tillyan model of state formation (as in the cases of Mozambique and Angola).

¹⁰¹ In fact some have argued that this is the “perfect” kind of threat for unifying a state. See Desch 1996, 249.

